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Financial Market Imperfections and Business Cycles
ABSTRACT
This paper develops a simple model of macroeconomic
behaviorwhich incorporates the impact of financial market
"imperfections," such as those generated by asymmetric information in financial markets. These information
asymmetries mayleadto breakdowns in markets, like that for
equity,in which risks are shared. In particular, we analyze
firm behavior in the presence of equity rationing and
imperfect futures markets, in which there are lags in
production. As a consequence, fins act in a risk-averse
manner •Wetrace out the macroeconomic consequences, and
showthatthey are able to account for many of the widely
observed aspects of actual business cycles.
Bruce Greenwald Joseph E. Stiglitz
Bell Communications Research Department of Economics
Economic Research Group Dickinson Hall
Room 2A-347 Princeton University
435 South Street Princeton, NJ 08544
Morristown, NJ 07960—1961This paper describes a simple model of macro-economic fluctuations based
upon the kinds of informational imperfections —chieflyrelated to adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard —thathave received substantial attention in the• recent
micro-economic literature) A major consequence of these informational imperfec-
tions already studied extensively in connection with insurance, labor and financial
markets, is that they interfere with the proper distribution of risk among
economic agents.2 In extreme eases, markets for sharing risk may break down
completely.3 As a result, individual agents must manage risks to some extent
without depending on external markets and they are likely to do this in two ways
that have significant macro-economic consequences. First, they can usually
reduce risks by reducing their level of economic activity; reacting to unexpected
"shocks" by adjusting this level of activity and, in the process, transmitting those
"shocks" to other agents. Second, accumulated "net" asset balances, particularly
liquid asset balances, can act es "buffer stocks" to absorb risks. Accordingly,
increases in net asset balances result in increases in economic activity. Thus,
fluctuations in "net" asset balances, which are likely to be "persistent", can lead to
persistent fluctuations in the level of economic activity. In the paper, both
1This literature is auw almost too vast to be summarised completely In a manageable number of
citations.For arelatively recent survey covering the areas most closely related to this paper see
Stiglits[1985].
See, br example, Arrow[1970J,Wilson[1977],Rothschild-Stigliti[19761on ineurancemarkets;
Greenwald (1979], Grossman.Stiglits [1976]on labormarkets; Jaffee andRussell[1978], Stiglits-
Weiss 1981] and Ross (1977jusfinancialmarketsand Akerlof (1970] for a general discussion of
the adverse selection issue. -
3See,for example, Akerlof (1970].-2-
these mechanisms are at work and they produce persistent macro-economic cycles
whose characteristics bear a striking resemblance to those of observed business
cycles.4
The model focuses on the behavior of firms5 and the derivation of an aggre-
gate supply function. The central role of informational imperfections is to res-
trict a firm's ability to raise "equity" funds in external capital markets.7
Specifically, we will assume that there is a fixed exogenous (and, considering sig-
nalling related dividend requirements, perhaps negative) flow of external equity to
firms. At the same time, in order to separate the "risk" distribution issues that
are at the heart of the model from traditional credit restriction questions, we will
assume that there is a "perfect" loan market. The output decisions of firms are
assumed to be made by "managers" who are averse to the possibility of "ban-
kruptcy".8 Finally, we will assume that futures markets do not exist and inputs
in emphasising problems of risk distribution this paper is in some sense a return to the tradition-
e.l approach of Kalecki [1939].
5This is done partly for the sake of expositions1 convenience. Extension to the "supply sectors of
households is complicated by the intimate connection between production and consumption within
households.
8This must, however, be sharply distinguished from a Lucas-type supply function (see Lucas
[1979]) since supply fluctuations are related directly to the varying impact of "reaV' micro-
economic market failures aad sre not simply dependent on fluctuations in Isbor supplies.
7Por formal models of this phenomenon see Greenwald, Stiglits and Weiss [1984], Majluf and
Myers [1984] and, in a slightly different spirit, Leland and Pyle [1977]. The bsslc argument is that
if the managers of firms, who are better informed about a firm's future prospects than equity
investors at large, are willing to issue stock at the current msrket price, then "outside" investors
ought to be unwilling to huy at that price. Hence, an equity issue announcement ought to be asso-
ciated with a decline in a firm's current stock price which should in turn inhibit equity issues. This
hss in fact, been observed (see Asqinth and Mulline [i983]) and is presumably related to the ohssr-
vatlon that iateraally generated funds ass by far the predominant source of equity for most firms
(see Taggart [1983fl. Agency considerations reinforce these arguments (see Jensen asd Meckling
(im]).
5Tbe justification for this kind of assumption is again informational. When a firm becomes "finan-
cially distressed", it is usually impossible to tell whether this is due to bad luck with projects
which were apriori properly undertaken or to bad management. Thus, managers will inevitably-3-
must be paid for significantly before outputs are soldY Thus, any decision to pro-
duce is inherently a risky investment decision.
The full macro-economic model into which the aggregate supply behavior is
embedded concentrates primarily on the existence and nature of business cycles.
Narrowly interpreted, the model does not involve either unemployment or, in any
detail, the macro-economic role of monetary institutions and financial markets.
However, simple and natural extensions of the model are capable of covering both
these areas as well as a number of related macro-economic phenomena (e.g. price
rigidities). The paper will, therefore, consist, beyond this introduction, of three
parts. Section I describes the behavior of firms and aggregate supply. Section II
incorporates the aggregate supply function into a complete macro-economic model
and describes the dynamic behavior of that model. Finally, Section ifi discusses
extensions of the model to cover a wide range of macro-economic phenomena
including aggregate investment behavior, unemployment and price rigidities.
I- Firm Behavior and Aggregate Supply
Firms, identified by an index I =1,...!,will be assumed to make decisions at
discrete intervals t =1,...T. At the beginning of each period, a firm inherits both
a nominal level of debt, B_i, and a "real" level of output, q, from the previ-
ous period. We will assume that there is a one-period lag between the use (and
suffer a stigma associated with "financial distress".
5Agaiu this sssumption rests ultimately on informational failures, typically associated with pro-
duct qualityandterms of delivery, which inhibit the development and use of futures markets. In
practice, futures markets are far from complete.-4-
payment) of inputs and the availability of output. Thus, cl_i results from pro-
duction decisions made at the beginning of period i—i, but becomes available for
sale only at the beginning of period t. For simplicity, we will assume also that
output is perishable and cl—Imustall be sold at the beginning of period t. We
will assume that the nominal debt, Ri_i, was incurred at the beginning of period
t—1 in order to pay for the inputs that were required for producing qJ.... Associ-
ated with this debt is a nominal contractual rate of interest R15_1 determined at
that time. Thus, nominal contractual repayments owed to debtholders by firm i
on entering period t are (i + R?_1) B;_1 -
Atthe beginning of period t competitive goods markets for the sale of q_1
open and clear. This determines the price P1 at which firm i sells itsinherited
output, qi The price P1 also determines the nominal "equity" position'0 of
firm i at the beginning of period t since
aNominalEquity Position of firm i at the beginning of period t
fl_1 — (i+R_1)B_1
The level of Al then determines the solvency of firm i- For some level of Al
sufficiently low (or negative) firm i would presumably be declared bankrupt and
reorganized with appropriately negative consequences for the managers (or own-
en, if owner-managed) of the firm. For simplicity we will assumethat Al c0
implies bankruptcy, although a non-zero (either positive or negative) threshold
could have been used without fundamentally altering the implications of the
t0For the moment we will ignore both equitysale.and dividend..-5-
model.1'
Simultaneously with the clearance of the several goods markets at the begin-
ning of period t, loan and labor markets open and clear. Thesemarkets deter-
mine w,thereal wage12 that firms must offer workers, and t, the expected real
return required by lenders. The expected real return, r1, then determines the
terms on which loans will be made available to individual firms, typically a
schedule13 relating R to q and A for a given expected real return and expected
rate of inflation. Combined with expectations concerning future output prices
and Al, these factor prices lead managers to select a level of output, q, which,
once workers have been paid, leads to a level of debt, Br', and a contractual nomi-
nal return, R, on that debt. Thus, this burst of simultaneous activity at the
beginning of period t produces levels of q, B' and R that firm i inherits at the
beginning of period f +1, when tbe entire process is repeated.
Within this temporal context we will assume that
[All firms produce output using only labor as an input with E =o(qflwhere
oisa labor requirements function14 with 0' >0and çY' ￿0,
'tlt should, however, be noted that the comparative static properties of a bankruptcy threshold
below seroareboth more complicated and less clearly determinate than those of a eero or positive
threshold.
12Given the average price level determined by the individual P' prices, real wage levels determine
also an equilibrium nominal wage.
t3See below for detailed discussion on this point.
146 could, of course, euilyhe made tovary acroes ffrms. However doing this would merely com-
plicate the notation with significantly altering the implications of the model. Note that is a
production function of the usual sort.-6-
[A2J the price level, P/, faced by an individual firm is determined by a see-
tora! random variable, i!,andthe overall price level, P1, where
(2)
andthe relative price of the output of firm i, is i,i.d, with a distribution func-
tion F('), and density f(S),
1A3] if Al C 0, firms go "bankrupt" and the entire proceeds from the sale of
are distributed without loss to debt-holders (i.e. there are no reorganization
or liquidation costs to debt-holders).'5
Given [A2] and [A3] lenders to firm i at the beginning of period t earn
returns which are a random variable whose value is resolved only when prices are
revealed at the beginning of period t +1. II P÷1 is high enough so that
A1 0, then lenders receive a nominal return Rb if P1+, falls below the level
at which A'1., —0,then lenders receive a nominal return ((P÷1q/Bfl —1)
where, given A1],'
B=P1w16(qfl —Al. (3)
Firms go bankrupt if what they promise to pay exceeds their income; that is when
(i+Rf)B' ￿ P1q
or, using (2) and (3),
t5latroducing reorganisation costs has an Impact on the results iimilar, but not quite identical, to
the effect of • negative bankruptcy threshold. Also with reorganization costs Inns will have an
additional incentive (beyond the managerial penalty) to avoid bankruptcy.
ISlif Ptwtd(qfl .> A, then the firm is a net lender and the probability of bankruptcy is lero.
Forthe remainder of the paper we will focus on the case where the reverse inequality holds..7-
d[,.i￿(1+Rj) [!i_]
w16(q() ()
4 a-areal equity level of firm i at the beginning of period t
and, thus,
a level of relative price in period t+i, u;÷1
atwhich firm i is just solvent.
Thus, real returns to lenders are,
-
(i+Rfl ifuj1￿ii7,
(i+RJ) -i , (5) Ug1 Qt -i..— i t
wØ(q() —at
Strictly speaking P41, looking forward from the beginning of period t, is a ran-
dom variable. However, in order to simplify the exposition, we will assume for
the moment that there is relatively little uncertainty about future price levels (as
opposed to the relative sectoral prices P1) and, thus, that
P11 P'.,1 aExpectedprice level at the beginning of period t +1(6)
looking forward from the beginning of period
Given equation (5), the expected real return to lenders to firm i in period t is
1Tbis assumption may appear extreme and indeed will be violated in the next section of this Pa-
rr. However, it can be relaxed without affecting the conclusion! of the model in any fundamental
way. Unfortunately, the price of such relaxation is considerable notational complexity eince it re-
quite definition of a bivariate price distribution covering both aggregate and sectoral prices; hence
the use of the present assumption.-8-
E[(1+ifl] [__!?_) (1+R) [_Z!__J[1—F(u7+i))+
"fxdF(x)(7)
wc(qg)—a1 o
where P÷ can now be substituted for P144 in the expression for Thefirst
expression on the right—hand side of equation (7) represents the expected real
return to lenders from those situations in which firm i is solvent in period 1 +1.
The second expression then represents the expected real return to lenders from
situations in which firm i is insolvent in period I +1. For determining the
appropriate contractual rate of return, R, we next assume that
jA4} Lenders are perfectly informed'7 and risk neutral which implies that
-.Pt
E[i+Rfl —1+r - (8)
Pg +
Equations(4) and (8) can be solved for the equilibrium level of the contrac-
tual nominal interest rate, R1, and the solvency relative price, asfunctions
of qg', a1',w1, YgandP1/P(1:
R;=R;(q;, a;, 1+rt), (9a)
=(q/,4,w,P1/P÷,, 1+rg) (9b)
Then, substitution from (9b) into F(u) yields
Probability of Bankruptcy eFi7(q1', a, w1, P/Pttrj 1 + rg
giving the probability of bankruptcy as a function of the decision variable, q, the
'TClearIy fot the informational imperfections that interfere with the issue of equity to exist,
tenders must not be able to use their information to purchase equity. The best way to interpret
[A41 is that lending is done through institutions that are legally enjoined from purchasing stock.
In any event, imperfect information on the part of lenders would intensify rather than alleviate
the problems embodied in the model.-0-
state variable, a, and the parameters, we (wages), P /I+i (the expected change
in the price level) and r (the real interest rate).
In deciding upon a level of output, we wilt assume that the objectives of a
firm's managers are described by the assumption that,
[A5 firm's select q/ in order to maximize expected real profits (i.e. total sales
minus repayment to lenders) minus an expected real cost of bankruptcy, i.e.
max —--—E[Pg'+iqe'—(l+ñt')(Paw1isq/)_Ai)]_ciF(+t).(10)
Pet'
Equation (10) is a simple way of capturing the hypothesis that firms act to
avoid bankruptcy. As we shall see, this bankruptcy avoidance behavior induces a
kind of risk aversion;71 similar results obtain whether these bankruptcy costs are
viewed as real (managerial) reorganization costs associated with bankruptcy or if
we view firms as maximizing the expected utility of profits with the utility func
tion characterized by a declining marginal utility of profits and decreasing abso-
lute risk aversion.176
We assume further that
[M] Bankruptcy costs increase with the level of a firm's output:
c=cq. (11)
This assumption is made largely for analytic reasons; similar results hold for other
bankruptcy cost functions as long as expected bankruptcy costs are convex in qf.
iTt Strictly speaking tlii. ii true only it c1 is appropriately convex inq. Liter we will impose
conditions which will ensure that this is true.
176
Greenwsld.Stiglitz [1987].- 10-
Thereare, however, three economic justifications which suggest that [A6]
represents a plausible simplification. First, as firms become larger they presum-
ably involve more managers whose loss of position, income and power in the event
of insolvency is likely to increase. Bankruptcy should, therefore, be a more seri-
ous matter for General Motors than for a local grocery store. Since qf is the only
scale variable in the model, having bankruptcy costs increase with q is the only
way to capture these scale effects. Second, a significant role of managers is choos-
ing a level of output (in the model this is their only rote). Bankruptcy with high
levels of output should reflect unfavorably on their ability to do this. Since ban-
kruptcy in the model is due to low prices, a high level of output in the face of
these low prices may, retrospectively at least, imply unusually bad judgement by
managers and may thus be unusually costly to their future prospects.tm Third,
having bankruptcy costs depend on q' is necessary in order to ensure that the
possibility of bankruptcy is never ignored. 1.1 there were a fixed cost of ban-
kruptcy independent of the level of output, then profits, which are increasing in
output, may grow so large relative to bankruptcy costs that bankruptcy becomes
a negligible consideration.19 Since the purpose of this paper is to investigate the
macro-economic implications of conditions in which managers (or owners) are
penalized for bad outcomes and are affected by the possibility of these penalties,
assumption [AG] is a convenient way of ensuring that these conditions are met.
seern.e especially likely to be true when managers suffer from degrees of financial distress
short of bankruptcy.
191n any case, we must assume that there is an upper limit on output (or that / increases
sufficiently rapidly) and the bankruptcy costs co-efficient c is sufficiently large that a maximum
for the objective runction in (As] exists. These technical assumptions are discussed in Appendix I.— 11—
Moreoverwith the addition of fixed bankruptcy costs there are reasonable cir-
eumstances under which the fundamental implications of the model with [A5]
continue to hold (see Appendix I).°
Given [A2] and (A4], the objective function of (AS] cnn he written as
max [q; —(1+rt)(wgth(q() —to — c/F(7..1)] (12)
Under these assumptions, a firm's real output is, therefore, determined by real
wages, real interest rates, real equity holdings, and relative price uncertainty.
The first order condition20 for an interior maximum can now be written as
1 —(1+r,)wó'=p (13)






if p were zero, equation (13) would he the standard result that output should
be increased to the point where the marginal product (i/o') equals the wage, tak-
ing into account the tact that the wage is paid the period before the output is
received (and bence in present value terms, viewed at the time of production,
wage costs are wt(I+rt)). Since p is positive, the impact of "bankruptcy" risks are
to restrict output; these risks drive a wedge between expected prices (i.e. i) and
marginal costs in the traditional sense (i.e. (1+r)wO').
20Theimplied restriction in 1A51 to a single period horiton is a matter of expositional convenience.
The multi-period maxitnisation problem is examined in Appendix I.
SOsThereare several restrictions that have to be imposed to ensure that the second order condi-
tions are satisfied. These arediscussedin Appendix I.- 12—
Moreimportantly, the variables on the left hand side of equation (13) —real
interest rates1 real wages and technology —havehistorically shown substantial
stability over time, changing only slowly at relatively predictable rates. In con-
trast, the risk variables on the right hand side of equation (13) which include the
financial position of firms, at, and the degree of uncertainty concerning future
prices (i.e. the distribution function F) may change rapidly and unpredictably. It
is these variables, many of which may be difficult to observe, which account for
cyclical fluctuations in the model.
The Determinant of Marginal Bankruptcy Risk and Individual Firm
Supply
The marginal bankruptcy risk, p1, depends, of course, on the level of output.
In addition, it is a function both of the level of "equity" of the firm as well as the
subjective probability distribution of the random variable We can thus
represent the supply function of a firm by an equation of the form
—g'(w,r, ol; ),
where4 represents a measure of the riskiness of the distribution P. It is easy to
verify that
g, <0: real wage increases depress supply;
g <0: real interest rate increases depress supply
Our main concert, however, is with the effect of equity levels and uncertainty
(risk) on production. It is possible to verify
Proposition 1. The Iügher the level of equity, the lower the marginal bankruptcy- 13-
cost(risk pervnium) P1, and hence the higher the level of production.
Proposition 2. increases in the degree of uncertainty result in an increase in the
marginal bankruptcy costs (risk premium) and hence in a lower level of
investment.206
Under the assumption that ôislinear, up to a capacity constraint, we can
show thatinvestment,as a function of the equity level 4,appearsas in Figure 1.
Fortherange within which the constant returns assumption holds, the elasticity
of supply with respect to firm equity is unity.20C
Accordingly,
Proposition 8. At least near the capacity level, output is a concave function of
equity levels.
These three propositions are the heart of the analysis: they imply that, if for
some reason, a firm's equity is reduced (e.g. because the prices at which the firm
is able to sell its goods are lower than anticipated) then, in subsequent periods,
the firm's output will be reduced.
Moreover, our analysis suggests that for highly levered economies the output
multipliers associated with equity injections may be substantial. For example if
in equilibrium, equity represents one third of total capital (which in this circulat-
ing capital world is slightly less than output), then with constant returns to scale
a Si increase in equity will yield $3 of increased output. Note that there are a
206Theprecise meaning of increases in uncertainty and the circumstances under which Proposi-
tion 2 is valid are discussed in Appendix I.
20cMoregenerally, with diminishing returns, the elasticity of supply is less than or equal to unity.- 14-
varietyof ways that such equity injections may occur; unanticipated increases in
the rate of inflation (monetary policy) as well as certain pump priming activities
can result in substantiat increases in the equity base of firms.
Later, we shall show the not surprising result that losses in equity will not
instantaneously be restored, and thus the model has the immediate implication of
persistence; a loss of equity at time t results in lower output, not only at time t,
but in subsequent periods as well.
The fact that the investment function is concave means that redistributions
of wealth within the production sector may have deleterious consequences for pro-
duction. Thus unanticipated increases in prices (say of oil) may have negative
effects, and, at the same time, unanticipated decreases in prices of the same com-
modity may have negative effects. Propositions 2 and 3 together imply that
increased uncertainty —bothcx ante (anticipated) and cx post —depressproduc-
tion. This will be true whether the uncertainty is due to concerns about real
shocks or to concerns with the instabilities of macro-economic policy.
Aggregate Supply. An aggregate supply function can be derived straight-
forwardly by summing the supply functions of individual firms. For simplicity,
we shall assume that all firms have the same production functions (6) and face
the same uncertainty (F). We can then write aggregate output as
;v)
We can approximate the expression by taking a Taylor series expansion around
the average level of firm equity holdings (under our symmetry assumptions), giv-
ing us an aggregate supply function of the form- 15-
—g(wj,rg,a;vp)
wherec is the variance of firm equity levels. The comparative static properties
of this aggregate supply function will, in general, mirror those of a representative
firm's output (with the additional effect noted that an increase in the dispersion
of equity ownership will generally lower output).
Since, in this model, output is restricted by failure in the market for sharing
the risk of bankruptcy, it is plausible to think of higher output as unambiguously
implying an improvement in social welfare.
U. Macro-economic Model and DynamIc Behavior
In order to embed the supply function of the previous section in a model
which is as simple as possible, we will assume that consumer behavior can be
described by the behavior of a single, infinitely-lived representative consumer.
Furthermore, we will assume that this representative consumer may borrow and
lend freely at the competitive real rate of interest, rt,andconsequently faces a
single lifetime budget constraint of the form
S — w1+1E1÷1)r,, = (15)
j—0
where
a real consumption in period t +3,
a hoursworked in period i-F]
, Efl bHnd 1 for] =0)- 16-
and
a real wealth in period t
Finally1 we wilt assume that the representative consumer has a utility function of
the form
aoIitil' (Zt+i —L(+)) (16)
where ii> 0and 11'.> 0.
Under these circumstances, equilibrium in the aggregate market for goods
and services is characterized by the conditions21
rt=S (17)
and consumption equals output,
Z=q. (18)
In Addition, the supply of labor is an increasing function only of the wage in the
current period, tv.Thedemand for labor is strictly speaking the sum of the
demands of the individual firms. However, in order to simplify the notation we
will write this as 4q)whereq is aggregate output and 6 now represents an
aggregate labor requirements function. The real wage is then determined by an
equilibrium in the labor market of the form
"(cd= s(w1),s' >0. (19)
This can, in turn, be solved to yield real wages as a function of aggregate output
21Thatis, the utility function (16) ensures that since the individuti is willing to trade off a dollar
of consumption at time t-f-1 for i+b at t, regardles. of the levels of consumption of goods or lei-
sure, the market rate of interest must be b.- 1?
of the form
tD= W(qg) 120)
whereiP' =(cY/s') >0.Finally,substitution from the labor and capital market
equilibria into the aggregate supply function yields a relationship of the form
=g( !P(qg), 5,a) (21)
which can be solved to yield
q1H(a1) (22)
where H' (g/(i —siF")) = (g4s'/(s'
—g,,,O')) .> 0.Thus, in each period out-
put is determined by the level of equity and movements in output over time will be
drivenby movementsin the level of equity.
Equity in period t+1 consists of equity in period t plus earnings on that
equity plus new equity sales less dividends paid. in nominal terms,
A1fl+1q--(i+)(Pwo(qn—A/)--?i+1
where M1isa nominal random variable representing the nominal value of divi-





(1+ 6) (w1th(q)— aj)—- 18-
whereunsuperscripted variables now denote aggregate quantities. Division by
P11 to convert to real terms yields an equation for real equity levels in period
t+1 of the form
p1+1 ='it — --——— (1+6)(wó(qj) —at)
— (23)
where m1+1 now denotes the real value of dividends less equity sales which we will
assume is determined exogenously.22 Equations (22) and (23) together with what-
ever determines "price shocks" (i.e. the variable Pf1 /P+1) now completely deter-
mines the dynamic behavior of output in the model.
In order that this dynamic behavior be at least minimally interesting the
level of net equity outflows (i.e. m141) must be sufficiently large --especiallyat
high levels of a1 —sothat the real equity level in the economy does aot simply
increase without bound. When a is plotted as a function of at (see figure 2),
the curve must at some point fall below and stay below the forty-five degree line
(it must also at some point obviously lie above that line). There are several ways
of assuring that this occurs. One possibility is to assume that growth (in either
the labor force or due to labor augmenting technical progress) occurs at a con-
stant proportional rate. Thea, when a÷1 and a are redefined in per capita terms
the need to equip new workers with the existing level of equity per capita will
tend to drive per capita equity levels toward a steady-state level. The difficulty
22Similaradverse selection and signalling arguments that have been used to argue that firms will
not, in general, have recourse to equity markets have also been used to explain why dividend levels
change so infrequently. For the short run analysis on which this paper, we can accordingly take
these as fixed. More generally, dividend Levels can be related to the state variables of the system.
is particular, to a1.- a -
withthis approach is that it requires an appropriate redefinition of the production
relationship to accommodate growth which is not straightforward. An alterna-
tive, therefore, is to assume that mt+i is an increasing function ofand, without
going into detail, that this function increases sufficiently rapidly so that a steady-
state equilibrium exists. Since equity scarcity is central to the kinds of equity
(dividend) signalling models that occur in the micro-economic literature and
underlie the model of this paper, the latter assumption is the one we will make.23
Formally, therefore, we will assume
—— (1+6)(wgç(q1) —a,)—rn(s,) (24)
+1
cuts the forty-five degree line from above as shown in figure 2.234
Cycles
Cycles (in the sense of persistent fluctuations) may occur in this mode! for
two reasons. First, even with P.,.1 =s+iin every period, deterministic cycles of




is sufficiently highly negative when it crosses the forty-five degree line (see figure
3The argument here is that when firms set dividend policy in order to distinguish themselves
from "weaker' firms they will do so in a way that tends to generate equity scarcity among the po-
pulation of Grins ss a whole. Otherwise dividend policy would ultimately not be an effective sig-
nalling device.
23iIfwe treat as a random variable, equation (24), together with equation (22), defines a
stochastic dilerence equation. The limiting properties of the stochastic process are studied else-
where. Here, we simply note that along each sample path the property of persistence, to be
described in the next subsection, will be observed.20 -
2)235 Since
G'=(l-J-b)—m'— ((1-i-(9th+1w)—1)H'
and (1+6)ô'w <1 (From the first order condition of firms), this requires that m'
belarge and that the impact of increased output on wages (i.e. Wó) also be large.
However, if these conditions are met the resulting "real" cycles bear at least a
casual resemblance to the "wage-shock" models which have been discussed, at
leastinformally, in theempirical literature. Prosperity in the form of rising out-
put and firm equity levels leads to both rising wages, which reduces profits and
internal funds flows, and rising dividend requirements. These in turn ultimately
reduce equity levels and output, which both restores profitability (as wages fall)
and reduces dividend requirements, causing the cycle to begin again.
If C, is always greater than zero, then no such cycles are possible and con-
vergenceto the steady-state is monotone. For future reference we will denote this
steady-state level of equity by ii'where
a =G(at) . (26)
Persistence
Second, random price shocks, which lead to unexpected fluctuations in the
real value of debt obligations and hence in real equity level, will lead to output
fluctuations which persist over several periods. Consider, for example, an unex-
pectedly low level of Pg41 (i.e. P141 <P÷1).From equation (24), this will lead
to an immediate and substantial drop in equity levels away from the steady-state
236
SeeGrandmont [1985] for a discussion of these cycles in a slightly different contert.• 21 -
level,a', (assuming that the economy started at a) with an associated drop in
output. The economy will return to a (and the associated "full-employment"
level output) only slowly as a result of successive positive increments to a. More-
over, these increments (and the associated increments in wages) will be fully anti-
cipated. They may not, however, be arbitraged away nor the process short-cut
because doing so would involve levels of economic activity that require firms to
bear unacceptably high levels of risk. Firms will do this only as they acquire
equity funds which, for informational (risk) reasons, they are assumed to do only
slowly over time.
There are innumerable possible ways to model the sources of these price
shocks. The simplest is to assume that output is sold on a large international
market and international prices vary in response to forces which are external to
the economy in question. A more traditional source of such "shocks" would be a
monetary sector which determines the aggregate price level. From this perspec-
tive, an unexpectedly low level of P41 might be associated with either an unex-
pectedly low level of money supply or, for some money demand specifications,
with an unexpectedly low level of consumption demand. Explorations of these
phenomena are contained in Greenwald-Stiglitz [1986], but they add relatively lit-
tle (at the cost of some complexity) to understanding of the basic characteristics
of the model in question.
In all cases, as in many monetary models with real effects, the source of the
real effect is a redistribution of assets as a result of the 'price shock", In most of
these models (see, for example, Grossman [1985:), the redistribution involved is a- 22 -
redistributionof wealth among households and it is difficult to believe that such a
redistribution would have significant macro-economic consequences. In contrast,
the redistribution that occurs in the model of this paper is between the equity and
debt of firms. It is for practical purposes a redistribution between managers
and/or owners who make production decisions and passive investors and/or
lenders. Given the important information asymmetries, this should more readily
be expected to have a significant impact on output. In the model, the effects of
any associated redistributions of wealth among consumers are, given the underly-
ing assumptions on consumer behavior, nonexistent.
A second variety of shock that might be expected to have persistent conse-
quences is what might be referred to as an "uncertainty shock". An increase in
the perceived uncertainty of future relative prices will, in general, lead to a reduc-
tion in the level of output (i.e. a downward shift in the function ). Ifthe
increase in uncertainty is permanent, then the drop in output will be permanent.
However, if
i—(i+b)wcY—(1+cS)'YcS<0,
then the drop in output is associated with a simultaneous upward shift in the
function 0(ag);assumingno change in the net dividend function rn(s1),lower
output raises profitability which increases the flow of new equity. As C (st)shifts
upward, a' increases and there is a gradual adjustment to the new higher
steady-state level of equity. This is accompanied by a slow, steady, but perhaps
incomplete recovery from the initial drop in output. The pattern is again one of
slow, persistent, fully-anticipated recovery.- 23-
muApplications and Extension
It should be stressed that the formal model presented above is a model of
persistent cycles only in the sense that recovery from the trough of a recession fol-
lows an extended path involving a predictable sequence of positive increments to
output. The model does not describe the kind of slow descent into that trough
which also appears to be characteristic of actual business cycles. Nor, although it
does involve fluctuations in real output, does the model explicitly involve unem-
ployment. However, as noted in the introduction to this paper, simple extensions
of the model appear able to account for these and other widely noted cyclical
phenomena. These extensions are described in this section of the paper and
include the following.
Fixed Investment BehavIor
One widely observed characteristic of business cycles is that fluctuations are
disproportionately severe in the investment goods sectors —businessfixed invest-
ment and construction, residential construction, consumer durables —ofa typical
industrial economy. Peak-to-trough variations in activity in these sectors are
greater than variations in the economy as a whole. This presents a puzzle for
traditional models since, in theory at least, investment projects should be less
intensely subject to the pressures of cyclical variations than shorter term under-
takings. It firms are risk neutral and on average forecast future output accurately
(including a future recovery from the current recession), then even firms facing
constraints on current demand should undertake some countercyclical investment
(for plausible values of the relevant cost curves). The costs of installation and- 24-
bringingplants on line should be lower in slack than tight periods; long lead
times for many investments argue against basing projections of demand at the
time of plant completion on current capacity levels and relatively small reductions
in investment goods prices should be sufficient to shift timing decisions. -Thus,
the fact that investment is so strongly pro-cyclical suggests that more is involved
than simply a passive response to fluctuations in aggregate demand. The para-
doxical nature of these investment fluctuations is compounded by the observation
that the fluctuations often appear largest in those sectors where traditional argu-
ments for fixed prices (and wages) appear to be weakest, e.g. home construction.
There are at least two ways in which a simple extension of the model of this
paper can account for these phenomena. First, investment goods sectors may for
informational reasons (i.e. they produce highly complex goods with high private
information content) have particularly restricted access to equity markets. At the
same time technology in these industries may be highly capital intensive and
firms in these industries operate with high degrees of leverage. Demand distur-
bances which reduce the equity bases of firms in these sectors will, thus, produce
particularly large output responses. Residential construction appears to be a
prominent case in point.
Second, if fixed investment is thought of as current expenditures which yield
output several periods in the future, the relative price uncertainty surrounding
these expenditures is likely to be far greater than that associated with expendi-
tures on next period's output. As depletion of a firm's equity base requires a
reduction in the risk that management is willing to bear, this reduction should
fall disproportionately on the firm's riskiest activities.!4 Hence, the model should- 25-
predictdisproportionate cyclical variations in the demand for investment goods
regardless of supply conditions in the sectors in question.
Inventory Fluctuations and Interfirm Interactions
Traditional theory has found it particularly difficult to account for the cycli-
cal pattern of inventory fluctuations. (See Blinder [19861.) While firms typically
accumulate excess inventories in the early part of a recession, they typically not
only reduce inventories in later parts of recessions, but even reduce inventory-
sales ratios. With traditional production models, inventories should serve as
buffers, allowing firms to engage in production moothing. Given the low levels of
real interest rates, and their relative invariance over time, even if real wages (and
other factor costs) did not vary much over the business cycle, one would expect
inventories to move countercyclically; a fortiori, if shadow wages (reflecting labor
hoarding) are lower in recessions, then inventory accumulation should be greater.
Although our model, as it stands, does not directly incorporate inventories, a
simple extension of the model offers some insight into the problem. Inventory
accumulation early in the business cycle may simply reflect the desire of firms to
take advantage of the lower marginal costs accompanying a reduction in demand.
They do this until their asset position (achieved by converting financial into real
assets in the process of inventory accumulation) so increases their potential
24Formally, the magnitude of the response to changes in equity levels is an increasing function of
the ratio ct/S where Q and 8aredefined in the Appendix. If firms are operating with bankruptcy
points in the lower tail of the relative price distribution, then an increase in uncertainty (i.e. the
spread of the F distribution) uhould increase ti/3.Thus,firms which are subject to high relative
price uncertainty —e.g.firms wIth high levels of investment and hence large Investments in far fu-
ture outputs —shouldreact most strongly to reductions in their equity bases. However, the fore-
going arguments apply to the case of decreasing returns-to-scale. With constant returns-to-scale
all firms reduce all activities proportionately.- 26-
exposureto financial distress that the process stops and, in the face of continuing
short falls in demand, is reversed. This may be augmented by the effect of
transfers of risk as output shifts (or does not shift) to other firms in a vertical
chain. For example, the initial inventory accumulations in recession environ-
ments may be due to the slow speed of information transmission and/or interfirm
interactions along a vertical supply chain.
Unemployment
Unemployment can be incorporated in the model in several possible ways.
Depletion of the equity bases of firms effectively reduces the "net" marginal pro-
duct of labor. This "net" product is the marginal physical product of labor less
the risk that firms must assume in the process of hiring and production. As this
risk rises, the "net" product of labor falls, In the model this appears as a decline
in wages and output (which increases the marginal physical product of labor
along the marginal product curve —seefigure 3). However1 in a number of set-
tings this could easily involve a degree of unemployment. A sharp rise in the
"risk" cost of incremental output could well reduce the "net" product of workers
below the disutility of the labor involved. Thus, lay-offs would be an appropriate
response to the loss of firm equity. Ideally, of course, workers would continue to
produce and firms would accumulate inventory for future sale. However, with a
depleted equity base the risk for firms of doing this is prohibitive. In theory,
workers could circumvent this difficulty by accepting deferred and/or contingent
wage payments (contingent on the realized price of the output when sold). But
there appear to be two arguments against this. First, the commitments of the- 27-
firmto pay higher wage in the future may not be credible. Second, the individual
in this position is, in effect, a supplier of a kind of equity capital: there is no fixed
commitment to repay, even if the firm has the best of intentions. Thus, the usual
moral hazard and adverse selection difficulties arise: it is precisely those firms
who are in the worst financial position (i.e., Eastern Airlines) who will be most
anxious to borrow from their employees, and offer seemingly the most attractive
terms.
Moreover, where workers are already unemployed and searching for jobs, the
existence of significant hiring and training costs may prevent the striking of
mutually acceptable wage bargains with potential employers. In making a wage
offer (presumably involving an extended period of employment), a firm will count
these costs highly since the associated outlays will carry a high "risk" premium at
a time when the firm's equity base is severely depleted. In order to recoup this
"risk" cost, the firm will require a substantial saving in future wages in order to
justify countercyclical hiring. From the perspective of the worker, these wage
sacrifices may not be justified, Unless his financial position is so impaired so that
immediate employment is a necessity, it may well pay the worker to attempt to
outwait the recession. He knows that as the financial positions of firms improve,
the effective cost to a firm of hiring and training will decline and wage offers will
improve accordingly. Thus, the model provides a "waiting" motive for unemploy-
ment; in a iecession a worker may rationally wait for an improvement in
economic conditions (until his financial resources are depleted and he must accept
a job).25 The worker could, of course, himself offer to bear hiring and training- 28-
costsbut the same difficulties arise in this case as in the case of wage deferral con-
sidered above. Indeed, since the unemployed worker is, if anything, less familiar
with the firm in question the difficulties should be intensified.
Finally, in the context of efficiency wage models, the decline in "net" worker
productivity may appear as increased unemployment rather than lower wages.
Price Rigidities
Price rigidities may arise endogenously in the model whenever firms are
imperfect competitors. Assume that these firms face demand curves that are be-
la.stic in the short run but are characterized by sufficiently high long-run elastici-
ties to restrain prices.2t Thus, raising prices increases current profits, but as cus-
tomers are induced to search to find alternative suppliers, future profits are
reduced. The restraint of this long run elasticity depends on the rate at which
future profits are discounted. As a firm's current equity base is depleted1 the
value of these uncertain future profits will fall relative to the immediate returns
available from raising current prices. As a result, prices may increase despite low
levels of current demand. And as all firms act in this way, the upward pressure
on prices may be reinforced. In the context of empirical observation, this may
well look like downward price rigidity.
25The implied pattern of increased probability of job acceptance as s worker's financialresources
are depleted by a long spell of unemployment appears to be characteristic of observed job search
behavior.
2tSet Phelps and Winter [l97Ofora model of this kind of firm.- 29-
Itshould finally be noted that all these phenomena may be intensified by
expectations cycle? which may be added within the framework of the basic
model. The interaction of the basic mechanisms of the model with these expecta-
tions cycles would then produce something that closely resembles Keynesian
descriptions of business cycles (although not perhaps Keynesian thodels).
ConcludingComments
This paper has explored the consequences of three simple, but we believe
plausible, characteristics of the economy' (a) firms act as if they are equity
rationed; (b) firms act as if they are averse to risk, to increasing the likelihood of
bankruptcy; and (c) there are imperfect futures markets, production takes time,
and inputs have to be paid before goods are sold. Accordingly, every production
decision is a risk decision.
Under these circumstances, the level and distribution of equity among firms
has real macro-economic implications. The simple model we presented can gen-
erate cyclical behavior and can explain why a variety of shocks to the economy
(such as price shocks) have persistent effects. Moreover, the theory provides a set
of explanations for a variety of phenomena which, at best, are difficult to explain
within the traditional neoclassical paradigm. Most notably, while in the tradi-
tional model, investment, particularly in inventories, should have a smoothing
effect, dampening fluctuations in demand, the variability of investment seems to
contribute to these fluctuations- Such fluctuations could only be consistent with
7See Woodford tse:.-30-
plausibleassumptions concerning technology (adjustment costs, etc.) if the cycli.-
calmovementswere accompanied by greater variations in real interest rates and
pro-cyclical movements in (shadow) real wages than is in fact observed.t8 While
Keynes was willing to let Animal Spirits serve as the Deus cx Machina to retrieve
an explanation of investment variability, our theory provides a more plausible
explanation of the variability in investment, or at least one which is more con-
sistent with currently fashionable strictures on hypotheses concerning expectation
formations.
We have noted too that traditional theory both failed to provide a rationale
for price (and wage) rigidity, and while ascribing considerable importance to these
rigidities, failed to explain why output fluctuations were greater in the seemingly
flexible price sectors. Our theory provides a rationale for price rigidities and an
explanation for why sectors with flexible prices may suffer greater output variabil-
ity.
Our model provides an explanation of another long standing conundrum in
econcrniics. Keynes argued that firms should be on their supply functions, and
that accordingly, when output was reduced real wages should increase. Soon
after the publication of the General Theory Dunlop and Tarshis argued that this
did not in fact happen. While there is some controversy over the exact numbers,
it is clear that real wages certainly do not increase to the extent that standard
production function models would have predicted.29 The resolution provided by
28Infact, with the exception of isolated episodes, real interest rates have not varied much over
the past hundred years. Keynes' focuses on the real interest rate as the critical variable determin-
ing investment seeme, at best, injudicious, as the subsequent criticism of Andrews indicated.- 31-
muchof the recent literature (Solow-Sitglitz, Barro-Grossman, Benassy, Maim-
valud, etc.), that firms are demand constrained (just as in the labor market,
workers are demand constrained), is not totally plausible1 even to the original
proponents of these models: why, in a competitive environment, should arms
that are able to solve the complex production problems which these models postu-
late that they can, not be able to discover that by lowering their prices, they
could steal customers away from their rivals and hence increase their profits?
The explanation provided by our model is that firms may! indeed, be on
their supply function; but that the supply function has sldfted to the left (see
figure 3), not because of the disappearance of capital, but because of increases in
uncertainty and the dispersion of equity holdings.3°
Macro-economic phenomena —unemployment,the variability in output and
investment, the lack of variability in wages and prices --arecomplex. No single
model, or even simple set of explanations, is likely to inform us concerning all of
its important aspects.
In this paper, we have argued that understanding capital markets --thecon-
straints that imperfect information imposes on the ability of individuals to divest
themselves of risk —isessential to understanding certain aspects of macro-
economic behavior. Other informational problems and the constraints to which
they give rise —includingcredit rationing --are,we would argue, essential to
29 Notice that implicit contract theory has been concerned with explaining why real wages do not
fail in a recession; our concern here is why they do not rise.
30 This is not to say that we would contend that there might not be short periods, during which
the economy was off its supply function. Firms may lower their prices only gradually, and if
wages fall, real' prices may fall even more gradually. During such times, the demand constrained
equilibrium is relevant.- 32-
understandingother aspects or these phenomena- 33-
AppendixI
Firm Supply Behavior
Suppressing the time and firm subscripts for the sake of expositional conveni-




Alsowe can rewrite equations (7) and (8) giving the nominal contractual rate of




= (i—F())+ f rdf(z) =z(). (A-2)
q 0
Inexamining this decision problem it will be useful to look first at the
constant-returns-to-scale case, in which with a suitable choice of units
0(q) =q- (A-3)
Given (A-3), the decision problem of the representative firm can be rewritten
max (a(1+r) + q[I —(1+r)w—
cF(ü)]) (A-4)
subject to (A-2) where h =(1+r)(w














Equation (A-5) can be rewritten as
q =ac(1+r)f/[(i—F) (nz—cF)1
where in1 —(1+r)w.The RHS of (A-8) is just a function of ',which,from
(A-I), is just an (increasing) function of q.
Solving for the Equilibrium Level of Output
(a) We first show that, under a fairly weak condition to be given below,
there exists a bounded solution to q. To derive this condition, we first need to
observe that as q increases toward infinity, h tends toward (1+r)w and
approaches a unique finite limit i10 which solves the equation
(1+r)w =(i—F())+ f xdF(z).
The last step in this argument follows from the facts that in any equilibrium with
positive output (l+r)w C 1 and that the right hand side of (A-9) increases con-
tinuously and monotonically to a limit E(x) =1as i10 goes toward infinity.
Thus, as q goes toward infinity, the probability of bankruptcy F(U) approaches a
finite limit F(0) eF0.In order that a maximum to the firm's decision problem




Otherwisethe firm's objective function, (A-4), can be increased without bound.
Thus, we will assume that c is sufficiently large that (A-JO) holds and conse-
quently that there is a finite optimal level of output.
(b) For a > 0, optimal output is positive (since a > 0 and 1 .>(1+r)iv
imply positive profits with no risk of bankruptcy for small positive q); while for
a =0,optimal q =0since, under those circumstances, it =(1+r)wand
F(ii)F0 for all q. Thus, if F is sufficiently smooth, the firm's objective func-
tion is locally continuous and twice differentiable at the optimal level of output.3'
Second Order Condition




where f'is the first derivative of the density function Ievaluatedat the optimal
bankruptcy point. At the optimal level of output, therefore,
(A-12)
Note that since, in practice, bankruptcies appear to be relatively rare for
31We will ignore the possibility thst two locally separate values of q produce the Caine optimal
value of the firm's objective function.- 36-
moderateand large-sized firms (i.e. they occur with probability less than one half
in any decision period), firms operate with bankruptcy levels in the lower tail of
the price distribution; if that distribution is single peaked, f' will be positive at
relevant levels of output. This, in turn, means that (A-12) is satisfied.
Note, too, that if the distribution F is characterized by an increasing hazard
function (i.e. f/i—F is monotonically increasing), then (A-il) is satisfied globally.
Graphical Solution and Comparative Statics
With constant returns to scale, the marginal return to production, ignoring
bankruptcy costs, is fixed (at what we have called rn), while the marginal ban-
kruptcy cost, p increases with q. At any maximum, the p(q) curve cuts m from
below; the discussion in the preceding paragraph argued that normally there will
be only one relevant intersection, and provided a global condition for a unique
intersection (see figure 4).
Thesimplicity of the structure of the first order conditions makes compara-
tive statics analysis relatively easy.
First, note that since, from (A-2), ,thebankruptcy relative price, is a func-
tion only of a/q, p is a function only of a/q. Hence, an increase in a accom-
panied by an equiproportionate increase in q leaves p unchanged: With constant
returns, dCn q/dCn a1.
Secondly, an increase in w reduces m (the marginal return from production,
ignoring bankruptcy costs), while from (A-2), at any q,ü increases; so long as the
second order condition is satisfied, this implies that p, the marginal bankruptcy- 37-
cost,is increased.32 Thus, as figure 4 illustrates, output is unambiguously reduced.
Thirdly, an increase in r reduces inwhile,from (A-2), at any q, ii increases;
again, so long as the second order condition is satisfied, this implies that p, the
marginal bankruptcy costs, is increased, and output is reduced.
Finally, we examine the effect of an increase in uncertainty. This shifts the
values of fandF corresponding to any set of values of the other parameters.
Straightforward differentiation shows that, at the optimum,
dp/dF =c+ (rn—cF)/(1—F) > 0 --,
Atthe same time
dp/df=(rn—cF)/f>0.
We focus our attention on the situation where bankruptcy probabilities (in
any period) are low. If an increase in uncertainty increases the likelihood of bad
events (F and Ibothincrease), then p will increase, and output will be reduced.
Even if F increases, but fdecreasesuncertainty will increase p (reduce output) so
long as the hazard rate is increased.
The General Case
The first and second order conditions for the general case (c/' c0)as well as
the comparative static properties can easily be derived. We simply present the
relevant formulae.
dp/dw =ci&/dw+(dp/dq)q2/a wheredu7dw =(l+r)/1—Fand
(dp/dq)>0 by the second order condition.
Denote the change in the distribution by dyThenwe can write the total effect on p as
dp/dy= cdF/dy +(m—cF)d; n-f/1—F }/dy.Hence,so long as the cumulative of the
bad states is increased andthehazard function is increased, p is increased.- 38-
(a)First order condition
1 —(1+r)wcieF+ k+w(ó'q— ó)J.
Note that o'q —6> 0 since 6" >0and 0(0) =0.
(b) The second order condition for an interior maximum is,
—(1+r) wd'3—o<0 (A-ia)
where






andthe various distribution and density functions (i.e. F, f and f', the deriva-
tive of the density function) are evaluated atA sufficient condition for this is
that (A-12) holds.
The comparative statics follow along similar lines to those presented before.
If we define m(q) as the marginal return to production, ignoring bankruptcy
costs, now in(q) is a decreasing function of q. Moreover, now, p is a function of
wnotonly indirectly, through the effect of w on,butdirectly. Nonetheless,
the basic qualitative properties remain.
First, for a change in real equity,




With decreasing returns (a/q)(dq/da) C 1 and proportional increases in equity
lead to less than proportional increases in output. In particular, note that if mar-
ginal labor requirements increase greatly beyond some point, c/q —o becomes large
and hence ç becomes small. Moreover q/a is becoming smaller and smaller.
Hence, dq/da eventually becomes quite small.3'
For changes in wages,






if 6" 0, then (w/q)(dq/dtv) <—1, since wO > a. On the other hand, if margi-
nal costs increase very rapidly as a firm approaches its "capacity" limit (i.e.
6">> O'/q,O'q >> 6),then near "capacity" (w/q)(dq/dw) > —1.
For changes in real interest rates,




On the other hand, one cannot ensure that q is everywhere a concave function of a. The
second derivative of' q with respect to a involves, among other things, terms in about which
we havesofar made no assumptions.- 40-
too E ——1ç=—ç. a
Thus(w/q)(dq/dw)((1+r)/q)(dq/dr) and wages have a greater proportional
negative impact on real output than interest rates.
The analysis of the effects of changes in uncertainty parallels that of our ear-
lier djscussion. Inspection of the first order condition shows that so long as the
uncertainty increases the cumulative probability of bad states (F) and the hazard
rate f/i—F, the marginal bankruptcy cost is increased and output is reduced.
More General Bankruptcy Cost Functions
An obvious extension of the form of bankruptcy costs is to add a fixed com-
ponent to the bankruptcy cost function so that it becomes
C(q) =c0+ e1q (A-i7)
The comparative static results become, in general, more ambiguous. However,
there are reasonable circumstances in which those results continue to hold.
For the case of constant-returns-to-scale in production, as above, a necessary
condition for the existence of an optimal level of output is that
1 —(1+r)w
—c1F0CO (A-is)
We will assume that (A-is) holds (and in particular that c1 .>0).With the now
modified bankruptcy cost function, the second order condition takes the form
2ef dh + <0 (A-is)
where a and dh/dq are defined above with C(q) in its present form substituted- 41
forcq.Sincethe second term in (A-iD) is positive,condition(A-l2), while neces-
sary for (A-is) to hold, is no longer sufficient (N.B. with CRTS, the second order
condition for the decision problem of the body of the paper is —a <0).
For an interior maximum at which (A-19) holds the impact of a change in
the firm's equity level is described by the equation
4q=I >0 (A-20) da aa—2p
where ji(c0f /q)(du7dh)(dh/dq) and,since the second order condition requires
that a —2p>0, a—t >0. Thus, with constant-returns-to-scale, adding a
fixed bankruptcy penalty does not alter the direction of a firm's response to an
increase in equity (it remains positive), but it does intensify the magnitude of the
firm's response (since (a —pt)/(a — 2j:)> 1). Similar results hold for output
responses to changes in real wages, real interest rates and the price distribution
F. Therefore, to the extent that constant returns to scale characterize a firm's
production technology —eitherbecause we are studying scale decisions or because
we are concerned with levels of output below capacity over which marginal costs
are roughly constant —inclusionof a fixed bankruptcy cost does not fundamen-
tally alter the implications of the model.
More General Utility Functions
A final obvious extension of the basic model is to settings in which firms'
managers maximize over a horizon which is longer than a single decision period.





subjectto (A-2), where E is a mathematical expectation, a11 is the firm's equity
level entering period t +1 and Visa valuation Function of the usual sort. For-
mally,
= — (1+r+1)(wo1—a)
where1 + f is the random real return to lenders.3S Thus, (A-2l) can be rewrit-
ten as
nax +V(att)] —cqî(ü). (A-22)
subjectto (A-2) with appropriate t subscripts on the variables.
In examining this decision problem, the case of constant returns to scale is
again the easiest starting point. With CETS,
optimal qtka
Therefore -
li',eoptimallevel of h=(1+rt)(wt — at/q*t)=(1+rt)(wg — i/kg)
whichmeans that h*t,:*andF(u*t)areindependent of at. Thus, cq'F(i?) is
linear in at and the valuation function for the multiperiod decision problem is
linear in at. 'With constant returns to scale, therefore, the multiperiod decision
problem is qualitatively identical to a single period problem and the extension to
This ignoresdividends. However,including them would complicate the analysis without alter-
ing its implications fundamentally.- 43 -
multiperioddecision-making is straightforward, involving nothing more than a
rescaling of the bankruptcy cost factor c.
Unfortunately the same simplicity does not apply to the general case and
here only the most general principals can be articulated. The flavor of these is
captured best by abandoning the specific formulation of "bankruptcy" constraints
since these no longer yield unambiguous results and simply assuming that
managers choose output to
max
a
where V is a general utility function, a41 is the end of period value of a firm's
equity
= — (1+r3(w1o(q1)—at)
and a1 is now allowed to become negative in order to repay lenders. For this
problem it is straightforward to show that (1) risk aversion leads to a reduction in
output below what a risk neutral firm would produce and (2), if V exhibits
decreasing absolute risk aversion, then greater firm equity levels lead to greater
output. Thus, if a multiperiod decision problem generates a valuation function
characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion, then in general we should
expect the results of the model (with respect to equity levels and output) to apply
without change.- 44-
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